We are not told, and it is hard to imagine anything short of a property interest that would satisfy the majority. See Simmons v. United States, supra, at 389. ] Accord, Simmons v. United States, -229 (1973). 428 [Footnote 3/4] Though the Amendment protects one's liberty, and property interests against unreasonable seizures of self [Footnote 3/5] and effects, [Footnote 3/6] "the primary object of the Fourth Amendment [is] . See post at 439 U. S. 165 n. 15. If the nonowner were the spouse or child of the owner, would the Court recognize a sufficient interest? In Alderman v. United States, Mr. Justice Fortas, in a concurring and dissenting opinion, argued that the Court should "include within the category of those who may object to the introduction of illegal evidence one against whom the search was directed.'" Rakas (defendant) and another man in the car were arrested. A "yes" or "no" answer to the question framed in the issue section; A summary of the majority or plurality opinion, using the CREAC method; and. Footnote 11 Conferring standing to raise vicarious Fourth Amendment claims would necessarily mean a more widespread invocation of the exclusionary rule during criminal trials. presumably be usable against the other occupants. This makes unquestionable sense. Brief for Petitioner in Jones v. United States, O. T. 1959, No. In Jones, the Court set forth two alternative holdings: it established a rule of "automatic" standing to contest an allegedly illegal search where the same possession needed to establish standing is an essential element of the offense charged, [Footnote 4] and, second, it stated that "anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality by way of a motion to suppress." We decline to extend the rule of standing in Fourth Amendment cases in the manner suggested by petitioners. 1, 36 n. 238 (1975). We reject petitioners' suggestion. (1925), and never expressly dealt with it again until today, many of our opinions have assumed that a mere passenger in an automobile The dissenting opinion urges the Court to answer this question by considering only the talisman of legitimate presence on the premises. 389 U.S., at 352 (footnotes omitted). 439 U.S. 128 . See id., at 368. -70 (1906). . Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921). But that would only change the extent of the protection; it would not free police to do the unreasonable, as does the decision today. CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS. U.S. 83, 99 We cannot, therefore, agree with the dissenters' insistence that our decision will encourage the police to violate the Fourth Amendment. The minimal privacy that existed simply is not comparable to that, for example, of an individual in his place of abode, see Jones v. United States, supra; of one who secludes himself in a telephone booth, Katz v. United States, supra; or of the traveler who secures his belongings in a locked suitcase or footlocker. The Court in Jones also may have been aware that there was a certain artificiality in analyzing this question in terms of standing because in at least three separate places in its opinion the Court placed that term within quotation marks. Ante, at 142 n. 11. In Simmons, we eliminated the dilemma by holding that the accused's testimony at the suppression hearing could not be used against him at trial. Our starting point is "[t]he established principle . 389 This is not to say that such visitors could not contest the lawfulness of the seizure of evidence or the search if their own property were seized during the search. Nor have petitioners chosen to argue that they were "arrested" in constitutional terms as soon as they were ordered from the vehicle and that the search was a fruit of that infringement on their personal rights. Rakas and the other man were convicted of armed robbery. We would not wish to be understood as saying that legitimate presence on the premises is irrelevant to one's expectation of privacy, but it cannot be deemed controlling. Here, petitioners, who were passengers occupying a car which they neither owned nor leased, seek to analogize their position to that of the defendant in Jones v. Unite States. ", United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891, 422 U. S. 896 (1975) (footnote omitted). Our disagreement is rather with the dissent's bland and self-refuting assumption that there will not be fine lines to be drawn in Fourth Amendment cases as in other areas of the law, and that its rubric, rather than a meaningful exegesis of Fourth Amendment doctrine, is more desirable or more easily resolves Fourth Amendment cases. Although Jones v. United States was based upon an interpretation of Fed. In support of their target theory, petitioners rely on the following quotation from Jones: "In order to qualify as a 'person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure,' one must have been a victim of a search or seizure, one against whom the search was, directed, as distinguished from one who claims prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure directed at someone else.". At most, one could say that perhaps the Constitution provides some degree less protection for the personal freedom from unreasonable governmental intrusion when one does not have a possessory interest in the invaded private place. See id., at 379 (POWELL J., concurring). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Rather, we are rejecting blind adherence to a phrase which at most has superficial clarity and which conceals underneath that thin veneer all of the problems of line drawing which must be faced in any conscientious effort to apply the Fourth Amendment. 362 Ventura Ybarra v. State of Illinois: Citations: 444 U.S. 85 . 390 denied, 389 U.S. 1055 (1968) (defendant did not have standing to object to search of codefendant's purse even though defendant present at time of search). 385 And as we have previously indicated, the fact that they were "legitimately on [the] premises" in the sense that they were in the car with the permission of its owner is not determinative of whether they had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular areas of the automobile searched. But petitioners and their friend the owner had excluded others by entering the automobile and shutting the doors. 397 In Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968), on the other hand, the Court concentrated on the issue of standing, decided that the defendant possessed it, and with barely any mention of the threshold substantive question of whether the search violated DeForte's own Fourth Amendment rights, went on to decide whether the search was "unreasonable." to property law concepts." Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925); Preston v. United States, [376 U.S. 364,] 376 U. S. 366-367 [(1964)]; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (1970). More importantly, how is the Court able to avoid answering the question why presence in a private place with the owner's permission is insufficient? Alderman, supra, at 174. ] Six Members of the Court joined THE CHIEF JUSTICE in Chadwick, and the two Justices who dissented in Chadwick did not disagree with the automobile distinction. In view of this holding, the court did not determine whether there was probable cause for the search and seizure. 408 The Court in Jones itself was unanimous in this regard, and its holding is not the less binding because it was an alternative one. See Simmons v. United States, Even if such a person is not a defendant in the action, he may be able to recover damages for the violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961), or seek redress under state law for invasion of privacy or trespass. ] For the most part, I agree with the Court's rejection, which was implicit in Alderman v. United States, He identified administrative problems posed by the target theory: Conferring standing to raise vicarious Fourth Amendment claims would necessarily mean a more widespread invocation of the exclusionary rule during criminal trials. 394 392 ] There are sound reasons for this distinction: Automobiles operate on public streets; they are serviced in public places; they stop frequently; they are usually parked in public places; their interiors are highly visible; and they are subject to extensive regulation and inspection. . Rather than seek facile solutions, it is best to apply principles broadly faithful to Fourth Amendment purposes. in Jones v. United States, O. T. 1959, No. But people seldom say such things, though they may mean their invitation to encompass them if only they had thought of the problem. In a similar vein, the dissenters repeatedly state or imply that we now "hold" that a passenger lawfully in an automobile "may not invoke the exclusionary rule and challenge a search of that vehicle unless he happens to own or have a possessory interest in it." . After this decision, police will have little to lose by unreasonably searching vehicles occupied by more than one person. E.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218 (1973) (sole petitioner was not owner; in fact, owner was not in the automobile at all); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (1970) (sole petitioner was not owner); Husty v. United States, 282 U. S. 694 (1931). The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed. Similarly, the Court attempts to distinguish Katz on the theory that Katz had "shut the door behind him to exclude all others," ante at 439 U. S. 149, but petitioners here did exactly the same. Before trial petitioners moved to suppress the rifle and shells seized from the car on the ground that the search violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Illinois Supreme Court denied petitioners leave to appeal. 435 The issue section includes the dispositive legal issue in the case phrased as a question. Katz relied on Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960), as support for that proposition. U.S. 128, 142] And if all of those situations are protected, surely a person riding in an automobile next to his friend the owner, or a child or wife with the father or spouse, must have some protection as well. U.S. 216 And as we have previously indicated, the fact that they were "legitimately on [the] premises" in the sense that they were in the car with the permission of its owner is not determinative of whether they had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular areas of the automobile searched. See Alderman v. United States, On appeal after petitioners' conviction, the Appellate Court of Illinois, Third Judicial District, affirmed the trial court's denial of petitioners' motion to suppress because it held that "without a proprietary or other similar interest in an automobile, a mere passenger therein lacks standing to challenge the legality of the search of the vehicle." The four occupants out of the search of an occupant the prosecutor argued that petitioners lacked standing, and is! We have taken pains to reaffirm the statements in Jones v. United States Westerbann-Martinez... Supreme Court denied the motion to suppress the evidence seized newsletter for professionals. S. 147. n. 14 v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 589 ( 1974 ) POWELL!, an action in stopping the automobile and neither has ever asserted that owned... Ammunition inside concurring ) concur in the case phrased as a question of Illinois—even subscribe directly Quimbee. 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